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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
judgment creditor commenced a special proceeding against it under
CPLR 5227. Under this section, notice of the proceedings would be
sent to the judgment debtor and any adverse claimant would be per-
mitted to intervene to protect his rights.134 Moreover, the bank would
have an opportunity to assert its reason for refusing to give the property
to the sheriff.135 In this manner, all of the rights of the parties could be
adjudicated and the bank could confidently pay out any money due the
judgment creditor.
CPLR 5231(h): Section does not apply to two different employers.
Once an attempt to secure payment from a judgment debtor proves
futile,136 a judgment creditor may direct the sheriff to serve an income
execution on the debtor's employer. 137 Under CPLR 5231(h), where
two or more income executions, each specifying the same employer, are
issued against a judgment debtor, they are to be satisfied, one at a
time,138 in the order of delivery to the sheriff.139 Even if a judgment
creditor is the first to deliver his income execution to a sheriff, however,
a recent case, Lischer v. Halsey-Reid Equipment, Inc.,140 posits that the
priority will be lost by the failure to renew the income execution each
time the debtor changes employers.
In Lischer the Marine Midland Trust Company (Marine) obtained
a judgment against one Spencer. Subsequently, Lischer also procured a
judgment against Spencer. In May of 1968, Marine caused an income
execution to be served on Spencer's employer. In August of the same
year, Spencer terminated his employment with that employer and began
working for respondent, who ultimately was served with an income ex-
ecution in the name of Lischer. When the employer failed to withhold
a portion of Spencer's salary, a special proceeding was commenced to re-
cover the amount. Petitioner's motion for summary judgment was
granted: the fact that a prior judgment creditor had served the sheriff
134 CPLR 1013.
335 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5238, commentary at 199 (1963).
136 The machinery in CPLR 5231 was designed to avoid harassment of the judgment
debtor who is willing to make regular installment payments to satisfy the judgment. 6
WK&M 5231.02.
137 CPLR 5231(d). The employer so served has a duty to withhold ten percent of the
judgment debtor's salary or be personally liable for any amount not withheld. See Royal
Business Funds Corp. v. Rooster Plastics, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 181, 278 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1967).
138 See 6 WK&M 5231.29.
139 The same rule applies to an income execution delivered to a sheriff prior to the
filing of a wage assignment. See Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Baker, 43 Misc. 2d 546, 251 N.Y.S.2d
556 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1964); see also 6 WK&M 5231.29.
140 63 Misc. 2d 637, 313 N.Y..2d 136 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1970).
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first was no defense inasmuch as the income executions specified two
different employers.
ARTICLE 75 - ARBITRATON
CPLR 7502(b): Court refers time-limitations objection to arbitrator.
In City of Auburn v. Nash'4' the Appellate Division, Fourth De-
partment, was called upon to determine whether it is the arbitrator or
the court who should decide an objection addressed to the timeliness of
a demand for arbitration. The case arose under a collective bargaining
agreement involving city employees. Special term found that although
the employee had fully complied with the prescribed grievance pro-
cedures, a substantial issue was presented regarding the timeliness of
the employee's demand for arbitration. Accordingly, an order was
entered which permanently stayed the arbitration.
The appellate division reversed on the ground that questions of
"procedural arbitrability" are properly decided by the arbitrator. The
court compared the contract before it with one wherein compliance
with time limitations is made a condition precedent to arbitration and
concluded that, in the latter instance, the issue of timeliness is for the
courts; 142 whereas in the former circumstance the issue is for the arbi-
trators. 143 As support for this proposition the court pointed to the pre-
sumption of arbitrability in labor arbitration cases, 144 particularly when
no language evidencing a contrary intent is discernible.
In reaching this conclusion no mention was made of CPLR 7502
(b).145 This section concerns statutes of limitations and reasonable time
limitations which are created by contracting parties.146 In either in-
stance, the issue of compliance with a time limitation is deemed a
"threshold" question 147 to be decided by the court. As such, the peti-
tioner who makes a timely application for a stay of arbitration is
entitled to judicial review. Moreover, a preliminary determination re-
garding the proper forum in which to decide the issue is of critical im-
portance inasmuch as a court's determination that the arbitration is
14134 App. Div. 2d 345, 312 N.Y.S.2d 700 (4th Dep't 1970).
142 Id. at 347, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 702, citing Matter of Bd. of Educ. (Heckler Elec. Co.), 7
N.Y.2d 476, 166 N.E.2d 666, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1960).
143 34 App. Div. 2d at 347, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 702, citing Long Island Lumber Co. v. Mar-
tin, 15 N.Y.2d 380, 207 N.E.2d 190, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1965).
144 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7503, supp. commentary at 136 (1966).
145 CPLR 7502(b) provides: "If... the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been
barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party may as-
sert the limitation. .. to the court .... "
146 CPLR 201; see River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36,
110 N.E.2d 545 (1953).
147 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7503, commentary at 488 (1963).
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